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Abstract: We investigate the optimal labor income taxation in a two-period economy 
with indivisible labor, stochastic preference/productivity shocks and hidden savings. We 
calculate the optimal allocation of an example economy and show that it is not 
implementable under the ordinary labor income tax system. Given this limitation, we 
propose two social security programs that can supplement the ordinary labor income tax 
system: one is a compulsory pension insurance system and the other is the provision of a 
limited times benefit to low-income households. We find that combination of taxation 
based on current labor income and either of these two supplemental programs makes the 
optimal allocation implementable in our example economies.
Keywords: Dynamic optimal income taxation, Hidden saving, Indivisible labor, Labor 
income tax, Social security programs
1. Introduction
By extending Mirrlees’ (1971) static framework to dynamic settings, recent optimal 
income taxation studies have considered a class of economy in which each household’s 
production skill is privately informed and stochastically evolves over time. It is often 
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assumed that households’ labor income and asset trade are publicly observable (this 
implies the observability of consumption as well). In such environments, optimal 
allocations satisfy the so-called reciprocal Euler condition rather than the standard Euler 
condition (Golosov et al. 2003; Kocherlakota 2005) and are implementable in a market-
based economy by imposing taxes on labor and capital.1 The required income taxation is 
history-dependent; in other words, the tax rate may depend on the taxpayer’s whole 
history of labor income.2
The assumption of observable consumptions/savings, however, may have limited 
empirical relevance in modern economies. There are a number of ways that a household 
can secretly transfer purchasing power to the future, such as accumulating durables and 
foreign assets. (Hereafter, we refer to these as hidden savings.) Thus, we investigate an 
economy in which households can make hidden savings. In this economy, any allocation 
that does not satisfy the Euler condition is not implementable and the government can 
not impose capital taxation. We show that the optimal allocation can be implemented in 
a market economy with a history-dependent labor income tax.
This history-dependent nature of labor income taxation is, however, rather 
complicated and rare in practice.3 It is questionable whether governments in the real 
world can adopt such full history dependent income tax rules. Recently, Weinzierl (2011) 
examines partial tax reforms to age-dependent labor income taxation, and shows that, 
under the assumption of observable consumptions/savings, there are small welfare losses 
from implementing not full optimal history-dependent income taxation, but age-
dependent income taxation. Although we are also interested in practical policy 
recommendations, we concentrate on policies to implement the optimum and not partial 
1 Golosov et al. (2007) and Kocherlakota (2010) review the literature in this regard. 
Kocherlakota (2005) also shows that capital taxation is regressive and that the average tax 
rate is zero, thereby raising no revenue when preferences are time-separable. Recently, 
however, Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) show that average capital tax rates can be 
negative when preferences are intertemporally non-separable.
2 Albanesi and Sleet (2006) show that the history-dependent taxes can be replaced with 
taxes on current labor and wealth in each period. Their conclusion relies critically on the 
assumption that the skill shock process is i.i.d., however.
3 There are some exceptions include the tax-favoring treatment of retirement savings/




In this paper, we pay attentions to a more practical income tax system which is 
solely based on current labor income. The optimal allocation is unimplementable under 
this restricted labor income tax rule if no other policy instruments are available. Thus we 
introduce two supplemental social security programs, which are similar to actual Social 
Security systems in developed countries. The two supplements are a pension insurance 
system and a limited times benefit to low-income households.
The pension system is compulsory for young workers and benefits participants if 
they do not work in old age. The benefit to low-income households is age-dependent and 
the number of times a household can receive it throughout its lifetime is limited. We 
show that the combination of tax on current labor income and either of these two 
supplemental programs makes the optimum implementable.
Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) show that, under the assumption of observable 
consumptions/savings, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a 
combination of three policy instruments that they term social security systems, namely a 
flat tax on current labor income until retirement, a retrospective capital income tax only 
at retirement that is dependent on labor income history, and a history-contingent 
payment after retirement. Although our paper relates to theirs, we allow for hidden 
savings.
Because of the difficulty of characterizing optimal policy in our economy, most of 
our analysis relies on numerical simulations of a rather simple two-period economy with 
indivisible labor.4 Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006, 
2007) use similar models in order to investigate disability insurance.5 These papers 
assume that disability is an absorbing state; in other words, once disabled, labor status is 
no longer a matter of choice. Consequently, the possibility of disability benefits 
4 Indivisible labor means that a household’s labor decision is discrete, namely either to 
work the given hours or to not work at all. Diamond (1980) develops this labor supply 
model in the optimal income taxation literature.
5 Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) conclude that the optimal social insurance plan needs to 
be supplemented by an interest income tax to discourage private saving. Golosov and 
Tsyvinski (2006, 2007) propose introducing an asset-tested disability insurance system in 
which a transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum because 
those who anticipate making false claims would accumulate assets to help smooth 
consumption.
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discouraging recovered individuals from leaving disability rolls is not considered.
By contrast, the “disability” or unproductive status in our economy may not be 
permanent (i.e., there may be some probability of recovery). In our example economy, 
the old households who were productive and worked when young should work if and 
only if they are currently productive at the optimal incentive-compatible allocation. This 
feature, however, may not apply to the old households who did not work when young. In 
fact, such old households must work irrespective of their current productivities at the 
optimal incentive-compatible allocation of our example economy. This lack of sensitivity 
of labor supply to current productivity status has a negative welfare effect from the 
viewpoint of production efficiency but eases the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. 
This asymmetric treatment between older groups who worked when young and those 
who did not explains why the two supplemental programs discussed herein help. For 
example, older groups who worked and joined the pension system when young are 
protected against productivity shocks, meaning that they can quit their jobs if they 
become unproductive in old age. Older groups who did not work when young, on the 
other hand, must work since they did not join the pension system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
model setup and define the optimal assignment under the direct mechanism where the 
government assigns labor supply and disposable income conditional on the reported type 
history. We compare the optimal assignment and market equilibrium without taxation in 
an example economy. In section 3, we show the government can implement this optimal 
assignment in a market economy with labor income taxation based on labor income 
history. Then, we show that the optimal assignment is unimplementable under taxation 
based on current labor income. In section 4, we describe the two supplemental programs 
and show that a combination of tax based on current labor income and either of these 
two programs makes the optimal assignment implementable. We conclude in section 5.
2. Model
We consider a two-period dynamic economy populated by one unit of continuous 
households. Two nondurable commodities, a consumption good and effective labor (labor 
for short), exist in each period {0,1}t  . Labor is indivisible, meaning that each 
household’s labor supply is 0 or 1, while the consumption good is perfectly divisible. 
Production technology that transforms one unit of labor into one unit of consumption 
good in the same period is available. There is an external financial market in which risk-
free bonds are anonymously traded at a fixed interest rate r.
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Households are identical except for the preference/productivity types that affects the 
disutility associated with labor supply. There are two possible types, namely H and L, in 
each period. Let tc  , {0,1}ty  , and { , }t H L   denote consumption, labor supply, 
and type of a household in period t, respectively. We assume that the ex-post utility is an 
additively separable function over consumption and labor supply in both periods,
0 0 0 1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( ( ) ( , )),U c V y U c V y    
where (0,1)  , :U    and : {0,1} { , }V H L  represent the discount factor, the 
utility associated with consumption, and the disutility associated with labor supply status, 
respectively. We assume U is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly 
concave, and that it satisfies the boundary condition 0lim ( )c U c   . Disutilities of “not-
working,” V (0,H ) and V (0,L), are normalized to zero. We further assume that disutilities 
of “working,” V (1,L) and V (1,H ), are positive and V (1,L) is strictly larger than V (1,H ), 
that is, type L households are “unproductive” in the sense that they suffer more from one 
unit of labor supply than do type H households.
The preference type stochastically evolves over time, and the households privately 
learn their type at the beginning of each period. Hereafter, we refer to period 0 
households with type 0 { , }H L   as young 0 , and period 1 households with type history 
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0 1( , ) { , }H L    as old 0 1( , )  . We denote 0 0( ) (0,1)    as the population size of young 0  
(where 0 0( ) ( ) 1H L   ). Young 0  becomes old 0 1( , )   in the next period with 
transition probability 1 0 1( , ) [0,1]     (where 
1
1 0 1( , )     is 1 for 0 ,H L  ).
The anonymity of financial trade implies that the government can not directly 
assign individual consumption level. This section considers a direct mechanism in which 
the government assigns a combination of disposable income and labor supply to the 
households conditional on reported type history.
A disposable income assignment is represented by 0 1( , )D D D  where 0 : { , }D H L  
and 21 : { , }D H L  denote disposable income of young and old, respectively. Let 0D  
denote the restriction of D to the households who report 0  at young. For example, DH is 
the pair of 0 0( )HD D H  and 1 : { , }HD H L  defined by 1 1 1 1( ) ( , )HD D H  . We call 
0D  a disposable income schedule for young 0  and we may write ( , )H LD D D . Similarly, 
a labor supply assignment is represented by 20 1( : { , } {0,1}, : { , } {0,1})Y Y H L Y H L   , 
and we may write ( , )H LY Y Y  where 0Y   denotes a labor supply schedule for young 0 . 
Note that if we repeat this economy in the manner of overlapping generations models 
with no population growth, then
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0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,Y Y
 








A pair of D and Y is called an assignment. An assignment must satisfy the following 
resource feasibility constraint,
0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )(
1( ) , , , 0.)
1
( ) ( )Y D Y D
r 
          
 
     
  (1)
Suppose a household does not make false reports for a while. Given 0D , a young 0  
chooses its private saving s to maximize
1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1( ) ( ) (( ) , ( , (1 )) ).U D s U D r s

         
This is a strictly concave problem and the first-order condition uniquely determines the 
optimal saving. Let 0 0( , )EU D   denote the maximized expected utility of consumption. 
Given 0Y  , young 0 ’s expected disutility of labor, 0 0( , )EV Y   , is
0
1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1( , ) ( ( ), ) , ( ,( )( .) ),EV Y V Y V Y

           
Since the individual types are private information, assignment (D,Y ) must have no 
incentive to make a false report. Let 0 1( , )     be a reporting strategy of a young 
household after observing its true type, where 0 { , }H L   is the reporting type at period 
0 and 1 : { , } { , }H L H L   is the plan of reporting types in period 1 conditional on the 
true type observed at the period.
Suppose young 0  chooses a reporting strategy , then, its effective disposable 
income is 0 0( )D   at young and 1 0 1 1( , ( ))D    at old. Let D denote this effective 
disposable income schedule. Similarly, its effective labor supply schedule is Y . Now the 
incentive compatibility requires the following conditions,
0 0
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),EU D EV Y EU D EV Y        (2)
for any 0  and any non-truth telling reporting strategy . There are 14 incentive 
compatibility conditions in general.6 If, however, a labor assignment for some old does 
6 There are 2 strategies for 0. At old, there are 4 conditional strategies for 1. Thus, 
There are 8 strategies for each young 0  and one of which is the truth telling strategy. As 
a result, there are 7 false reporting strategies for each young 0 .
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not depend on the reporting type at old, that is, 1 0 1 0( , ) ( , )Y H Y L   for some 0 , then the 
incentive compatibility conditions for young 0  and three non-truth telling reporting 
strategies satisfying 0 0   are summarized by
1 0 1 0( , ) ( , ).D H D L 
We refer to an assignment satisfying (1) and (2) as a feasible assignment.




0 0 0 0( )( ( , ) ( , )),EU D EV Y 

   
subject to (1) and (2).
Note that the optimal assignment is not unique for the government because of the 
Ricardian equivalence. To see this, let (D,Y ) be a feasible assignment and consider the 
following disposable income assignment D defined by
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1( ) ( ) ( ), ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ), for all , ,D D q D D r q              
where q is an arbitrary function from {H,L} to . It is obvious that assignment ( , )D Y  is 
also feasible, because this arrangement can be undone by adjusting anonymous private 
savings. This means, any feasible assignment can be normalized such that no household 
makes non-trivial saving. A normalized feasible assignment (D,Y ) must satisfy the 
following Euler (no saving) conditions:
1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0( ( )) (1 ) , ( , ), for all( ) ( .)U D r U D

           (3)
Now, we define that (D,Y ) is an optimal normalized assignment if it maximizes the 
unconditional expected utility subject to (1), (2), and (3). Let ( , )D Y   denote the optimal 
normalized assignment. Given ( , )D Y  , general optimal assignment ( , )D Y  satisfies the 
following condition for some (sH,sL),
0
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
( ) ( ) , for all
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) , for all , .
D D s










The number of control variables and constraints makes the analysis of the optimal 
normalized assignment difficult while this is a standard Kuhn-Tucker problem. In the 
following sections, thus, we specify the utility function and stochastic process, and study 
numerically obtained ( , )D Y  .7
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2.1. An example economy
We consider the following example economy. In period 0, 80% of households are 




( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , 0.7 0.3
.
, , 0.2 0.8
H H H L
L H L L
 
 
   
   
   
With these parameters, 40% of old households are unproductive. We assume the 
logarithmic utility function for consumption, ( ) ln( )U c c , and that the disutility of work 
is ( (1, ), (1, )) ( ln(1/ 2), ln(1/ 4))V H V L    . If a productive household works and 
consumes all of its own products, utility in the period is ln(1) (1, ) ln(1/ 2)V H  . This 
amounts to the utility when it does not work and receives a half of the worker’s product. 
Thus, the disutility of work for productive households amounts to a half of their 
products. Similarly, the disutility of work for unproductive households amounts to three-
quarters of their products. Moreover, one period corresponds to 25 years and both of the 
real interest rate and the annual discount rate are 2%, that is, 250.98 0.60    and 
251 0.98 1.66r    .
Table 1 compares the market equilibrium without tax, the first best allocation, and 
the optimal assignment. The table has four parts and the first part shows the parameter 
specifications. The second column is the benchmark case and the followings have one of 
parameters different from the benchmark. The second part shows the market equilibrium 
without tax. In the table, 0 0( )C   and 1 0 1( ),C    denote the consumption of young 0  and 
old 0 1( , )  , respectively. Y L, 0( )C L , 1( , )C L H  and 1( , )C L L  at the benchmark case here, for 
example, claims that young L works and consumes 0.655 at young, works and consumes 
1.572 at old if productive, and does not work and consumes 0.572 at old if unproductive. 
0  denotes the ratio of the value of consumption schedule to the value of labor supply 
schedule of young 0 , that is,
7 Labor indivisibility makes the choice set of Y finite and simplifies the numerical 
procedure. Given a choice of Y, the problem to find the best D becomes a maximization 
problem with 6 control variables, three equality constraints (budget constraint and two 
Euler conditions), and 14 non-negative conditions of incentive compatibility. We solve it 
for each choice of Y and compare the solutions to find the optimal normalized assignment.
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Table 1.   Market equilibrium without tax, the first best allocation, and the optimal normalized 
assignment
Parameter specifications
V (1,H ) ln (1/2) ln (2/3) ln (1/2) ln (1/2) ln (1/2) ln (1/2)
V (1,L) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/3) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/4)
 0 (H ) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
 1 (H,H ) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
 1 (L,L) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
Market equilibrium without tax
Y H (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1)
C0 (H ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 (H,H ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 (H,L) 1 1 1 1 1 1
 H 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Y L (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0)
C0 (L) 0.655 0.655 1 0.655 0.655 0.639
C1 (L,H ) 1.572 1.572 1 1.572 1.572 1.599
C1 (L,L) 0.572 0.572 1 0.572 0.572 0.599
 L 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
GDP(ze) 1.84 1.84 2.0 1.92 1.84 1.82
Welfare (we) 1.411 1.077 1.29 1.324 1.378 1.415
First best allocation
Y H (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0)
C0 (H ) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
C1 (H,H ) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
C1 (H,L) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
 H 0.817 0.817 1.025 0.908 0.816 0.808
Y L (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (1,1,1) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
C0 (L) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
C1 (L,H ) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
C1 (L,L) 0.725 0.725 0.91 0.806 0.755 0.717
 L 9.628 9.628 0.91 10.707 10.028 19.057
GDP(z f ) 1.4 1.4 1.76 1.55 1.48 1.38
z f / ze 0.761 0.761 0.88 0.807 0.804 0.758
Welfare (w f ) 1.322 0.987 1.283 1.242 1.29 1.33
w f 0.057 0.057 0.005 0.053 0.056 0.054
Optimal normalized assignment
(1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0)
0.787 0.788 1 0.816 0.83 0.787
1.072 0.92 1 1.111 1.042 1.072
0.485 0.591 1 0.503 0.457 0.485
 H 0.933 0.903 1.0 0.967 0.936 0.933
(0,1,1) (0,1,1) (1,1,1) (0,1,1) (0,1,1) (0,1,1)
0.613 0.722 1 0.636 0.612 0.613
0.613 0.722 1 0.636 0.612 0.613
0.613 0.722 1 0.636 0.612 0.613
 L 1.63 1.918 1.0 1.69 1.627 1.63
1.56 1.56 2.0 1.63 1.64 1.56
0.848 0.848 1.0 0.849 0.891 0.857
1.369 1.004 1.29 1.29 1.339 1.378
0.027 0.046 0 0.021 0.025 0.024
H HY Y 
0 0( ) ( )C H D H 
1 1( ) ( ), ,C H H D H H 
1 1( ) ( ), ,C H L D H L 
L LY Y 
0 0( ) ( )C L D L 
1 1( ) ( ), ,C L H D L H 
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Since no income redistribution takes place in the market equilibrium without tax, both 
of H  and L  are unity here. This absence of redistribution leads, in the most cases, all the 
households except for old (L,L) to work. Only old (L,L) does not work because young L 
expects to stay unproductive in old age with a high probability, and thus saves more in 
order to prepare for the future low productivity.
The third part of the table shows the first best allocation which maximizes the 
unconditional expected utility subject to (1) alone. The first best consumption 
assignment does not depend on preference type because of the consumption smoothing. 
Productive households tend to work more due to the production efficiency. In fact, 
households work if and only if they are productive in all the cases except for the fourth 
column. This fact and the consumption smoothing make the first best allocation 
incentive incompatible. The first best allocation has a higher welfare but lower GDP 
comparing to the market equilibrium without tax. The welfare difference, 0.099
1.322  1.411, corresponds to 5.7% increase of labor productivity and fw  shows this 
number.8 GDP at the first best allocation is 76.1% of the GDP at the market equilibrium 
without tax in the benchmark case.
The last part of the table shows the optimal normalized assignment. The incentive 
compatibility condition makes the welfare level between the market equilibrium and the 
first best. At the benchmark case, the welfare difference between the market equilibrium 
and the optimal assignment amounts to 2.7% change of the labor productivity (see the 
row of w  ). Consumption schedule is not smooth here. For example, consumption of 
old (H,H ), 1.072 at the benchmark, is higher than that of old (H,L), 0.485, to prevent 
the former from pretending the latter. In all the cases except for the fourth column, the 
government assigns labor supply to unproductive old (L,L) as well as all the productive 
households. Recall that the first best assigns labor to the productive households only in 
these cases. If the government chooses this first best labor assignment, it has to set the 
disposable income of old (L,H ) to be sufficiently higher than that of old (L,L) in order 
to prevent a false report by old (L,H ). The welfare cost created by this consumption 
8 Increase of labor productivity by 5.7% at the market equilibrium causes the proportional 
increase of consumption schedule and increases the welfare by (1 )ln(1.057) 0.099  .
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uncertainty dominates the benefit of the first best labor assignment in these cases. Thus, 
the optimal normalized assignment offers the same consumption-labor combination to 
old (L,H ) and old (L,L). The same argument does not apply to the income-labor 
combination of old (H,H ) and old (H,L) since young H works more and enjoy larger 
consumption in old age, which reduces the curvature of U function and welfare gain 
from the consumption smoothing.
These basic properties of the optimal assignment apply to all the cases except for the 
fourth column, where the difference of V (1,H ) and V (1,L) is small. In this exceptional 
case, the market equilibrium coincides the optimal assignment so that there is no room 
for welfare improvement by income redistribution.
One may think that the numbers in Table 1 depends on the parameter specifications. 
The optimal labor assignment, however, is fairly insensitive to parameter changes. In fact, 
we calculated the optimal normalized assignment and market equilibrium without tax for all 
the combinations of parameters 0 {0.7,0.8,0.9,0 9 }( 9) .H  , 1 , {0.6,0.7,0.8 0) 9}( , .H H  , 
1 , {0.7,0.8,0.9, .) 9}( 0 9L L  , and ( (1, ), (1, ))V H V L  is ( ln(1/ 2), ln(1/ 4))  , ( ln(1/ 2),
ln(1/ 3)) , ( ln(2 / 3), ln(1/ 4))  , ( ln(2 / 3), ln(1/ 3))  , or ( ln(2 / 3)), ln(1/ 2))  . We 
found that 160 cases out of 320 reveal features similar to the the fourth column of the 
table, that is, the optimal labor assignment is equivalent to the market equilibrium labor 
supply so that there is no role for taxation, while the optimal labor assignment is the 
following, the same as the benchmark case, in 84 of the other 160 cases.
0 1 1
0 1 1
1, , 1,( ) ( ) ( , 0
.
)
( ) 0, , ,( ( ) 1)
H Y H H Y H L
L
Y
Y L H Y L LY









We assume the optimal labor assignment satisfies (5) in the following sections.
3.  Implementation of  the optimal assignment by history dependent labor income 
taxation
Section 2 investigated the direct mechanism by which the government assigns a 
combination of disposable income and labor supply conditional on the reported type 
history. This section examines how we can implement the optimal assignment in a market-
based economy by labor income tax. Labor income taxation in this section may depend 
not only on labor income at the period but also on labor income history, and is represented 
by the disposable income policy 0 1( , )X X X  where 0 : {0,1}X  and 21 : {0,1}X  
are disposable income of young and old, respectively. Given X and young 0 ’s labor supply 
schedule 0Y  , let 0 3( )X Y    denote the implied disposable income schedule of young 0 , 
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that is, 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0( ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))( ) ( , , , , , , )X Y X Y X Y Y H X Y Y L      . Given X, young 
0  chooses 0Y   to maximize
0 0
0 0( ( ), ) ( , ).EU X Y EV Y   (6)
If 0Y   maximizes the above for all 0 , and the implied assignment, that is, the pair of 
( ( ), ( ))H LD X Y X Y  and ( , )H LY Y Y , satisfies the budget constraint (1), then (X,Y ) is 
called a market equilibrium and we say this history dependent disposable income policy 
X implements assignment (D,Y ). If the equilibrium attains the highest unconditional 
expected utility among all market equilibria, we say X is optimal. The optimal disposable 
income policy is, by the similar argument of the previous section, not unique because of 
the Ricardian equivalence.
Notice that, any assignment implemented by an equilibrium (X,Y ) must be incentive 
compatible under the direct mechanism owing to the revelation principle. This means X 
is optimal if it implements the optimal normalized assignment ( , )YD  .
Suppose X implements the optimal normalized assignment satisfying (5). By the 
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X D H L
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Conditions (7) determine X except for 1( )0,0X . The optimal assignment does not allow 
households to experience the ex-post labor supply history 0 1( 0)y y  , thus the above 
condition does not specify the disposable income for such a never working old. In this 
market-based economy, by the contrast, the government must announce disposable 
incomes for all possible labor supply histories including 1( )0,0X . To implement the 
optimal assignment, 1( )0,0X  must be set low enough so that no household choose the 
situation.
The equilibrium conditions of ( , )X Y  and (7) require
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( ( ), ) ( , ),EU D EV Y EU X Y EV Y         
for any 0  and any 0Y  . If 0Y   has no possibility of never-working, 0 1( 0)y y  , expost, 
then the incentive compatibility condition of the optimal assignment implies the above 
condition. If 0Y   has positive probability of never-working expost, on the other hand, the 
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right hand side is strictly increasing in 1( )0,0X . Thus, the above condition determines the 
upper bound of 1( )0,0X , denoted by e . In the benchmark case of our example economy, 
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for some ( , )H Ls s .
4. History independent labor income taxation
The previous section showed that the optimal assignment can be implemented in a 
market based economy if the government can impose tax based on labor income history. 
This history dependent nature, however, is uncommon in real-life labor income tax 
systems. This section examines a simpler and more realistic tax system which is solely 
based on current labor income. Taxation here is represented by a function : {0,1}T  
and the implied disposable income policy E is
0 1 1
0 1 1
0 1,0 0,0 (0)
.
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1,1 0,1( ) 1 (1)
X X X T
X X X T
   
    
(9)
Suppose an assignment (D,Y ) is implemented by X satisfying (9), then we say the 
assignment is implemented by history independent labor income taxation T. If no other 
assignment implemented by an history independent labor income taxation attains higher 
unconditional expected utility, T is said to be optimal.
(8) and (9) must hold if a history independent labor income taxation T implements 
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It is not possible for T (0) and T (1) to satisfy the three conditions in general. Therefore, 
the optimal assignment is not implementable here.
Table 2 shows the optimal history independent labor income tax and the 
implemented assignment for the example economy.9 The labor assignment here is the 
same as the optimal labor assignment of Table 1 except for the case of the fourth column 
while the attained unconditional expected utility is a little short. The row of iw  shows 
the difference of unconditional expected utility here and no-tax market equilibrium in 
terms of labor productivity. In the benchmark case, this number, 1.7%, is a little short of 
the number of the optimal assignment, 2.7%w  . Thus, the history independence of 
labor income tax costs 1%iw w    of labor productivity or GDP in the benchmark 
case. The numbers of the row of iw w  , differs across the columns, but they are 
between 0.5% and 1% except for the fourth column.
Table 2.  Optimal history independent tax
Parameter specifications
V (1,H ) ln (1/2) ln (2/3) ln (1/2) ln (1/2) ln (1/2) ln (1/2)
V (1,L) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/3) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/4)
 0 (H ) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
 1 (H,H ) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
 1 (L,L) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
Optimal allocation with history independent tax
T (0) 0.308 0.49 0 0.316 0.33 0.308
T (1) 0.084 0.186 0 0.062 0.075 0.084
Y H (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0)
C0 (H ) 0.804 0.765 1 0.824 0.844 0.804
C1 (H,H ) 1.101 0.895 1 1.128 1.06 1.101
C1 (H,L) 0.493 0.571 1 0.505 0.465 0.493
 H 0.955 0.876 1 0.978 0.952 0.955
Y L (0,1,1) (0,1,0) (1,1,1) (0,1,1) (0,1,1) (0,1,1)
C0 (L) 0.537 0.506 1 0.55 0.554 0.537
C1 (L,H ) 0.537 0.788 1 0.55 0.554 0.537
C1 (L,L) 0.537 0.464 1 0.55 0.554 0.537
 L 1.426 6.834 1 1.461 1.472 1.426
GDP(zi) 1.56 1.4 2 1.63 1.64 1.56
zi / ze 0.848 0.761 1 0.849 0.891 0.857
Welfare (wi) 1.383 1.02 1.29 1.299 1.35 1.392
wi 0.017 0.036 0 0.016 0.018 0.014
wwi 0.01 0.01 0 0.005 0.007 0.01
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5.  Two social security programs that supplement the history independent labor 
income taxation
Section 3 showed that the optimal assignment is implementable if labor income tax is 
allowed to depend on personal labor income history. It may be difficult for the 
government to levy such a complex tax in actual economy, however. This section proposes 
two programs that supplement the history independent tax system to make the optimal 
assignment implementable. These two supplements are termed a “compulsory pension 
insurance system” and a “limited times age-dependent benefit to low-income 
households”.
5.1. Compulsory pension insurance system
Consider a market economy with history independent labor income tax T and a 
compulsory public pension insurance system. A working young here must join the 
pension system and pay premium 0p . It can receive pension benefit 1p  if it does 
not work in old age. Not-working young is not asked to join the pension system (that is, 
need not pay p0 when young, but they therefore cannot receive the benefit in old age). 
Given T and 0 1( , )p p , the implied disposable income policy X is
9 We can calculate the optimal T according to the following procedure. Let us choose an 
arbitrary number (0,1)h  and set the tentative tax T by (0)T h   and (1) 0T  . Given 
this, we solve the choice of labor supply schedules by the households, (Y H,Y L), then 
calculate the ratio of the present value of the tentative disposable income and the one of 
the before tax labor income,
0 1
0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1( ) , ( , ( , )( ) ( )










          

       
     
   
 
 
Since the implied assignment of the tentative tax T may not satisfy the budget constraint, 
we apply the proportional adjustment to the disposable income by the factor of  . In 
other words, we adjust T such that (0)T h  and (1) 1T   . Since the utility function 
is logarithmic, this adjustment does not affect the choice of labor supply and makes the 
implied assignment satisfy the budget constraint. Thus, the adjusted T determines an 
implemented assignment. The grid research with respect to h yields the optimal history 




































If X implements one of optimal (not necessarily normalized) assignments, X must satisfy 
(8). Thus, given e not larger than e , (8) and (10) determine a combination of history 
independent labor income tax T and compulsory public pension insurance system 
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The last two equations claim that the size of pension insurance system is minimized when 
e is set at the upper bound e . The next table shows the optimal combination of the 
10 The following equation determines private savings, s , as well as the policy instruments, 
0 1( , , )T p p . If the government chooses the optimal policy, then young   chooses Y   and 
the corresponding saving s  to realizes the optimal assignment. Similar arguments also 
hold in the next subsection.
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history independent labor income tax and the supplementary pension system at e e .
The first part of table 3, the parameter specifications, is the same as the previous 
tables except for the fourth column of Table 1, the case having no room for welfare 
improvement by taxation. The middle part shows the optimal combination of history 
independent labor income tax and the minimized pension insurance system. The net 
incomes for young households, which take into account labor income tax/transfers as 
well as pension premium/benefits, are 0.815 (10.010.186) for workers and 0.374 
for not-workers, in the benchmark case. Joining the pension insurance system must be 
compulsory since its return p1 /p0 is lower than the market rate 1 r 1.67. The income 
tax system runs a deficit (both T (1) and T (0) are negative) but it is financed by the 
surplus created by the pension system.
Because young working H are protected by the pension benefit in old age, they do 
not hesitate to retire when they become unproductive. By contrast, young L households 
do not join the pension system, and thus they have to work in old age even when they are 
unproductive. This asymmetric protection against preference/productivity shocks in old 
Table 3.  Two supplemental policies
Parameter specifications
V (1,H ) ln (1/2) ln (2/3) ln (1/2) ln (1/2) ln (1/2)
V (1,L) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/4) ln (1/4)
 0 (H ) 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
 1 (H,H ) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
 1 (L,L) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
e 0.66 0.564 0.685 0.642 0.655
Compulsory pension insurance system
T (0) 0.374 0.44 0.388 0.374 0.369
T (1) 0.01 0.188 0.047 0.008 0.018
p0 0.186 0.562 0.192 0.157 0.199
p1 0.049 0.42 0.051 0.05 0.063
sH 0.037 0.162 0.039 0.021 0.032
sL 0.239 0.282 0.248 0.239 0.244
Limited times age dependent benefit to low income households
T (0) 0.259 0.09 0.268 0.275 0.245
T (1) 0.106 0.162 0.073 0.09 0.106
b0 0.186 0.562 0.192 0.157 0.199
b1 0.049 0.42 0.051 0.05 0.063
sH 0.107 0.049 0.111 0.08 0.107
sL 0.169 0.07 0.176 0.18 0.169
18
age makes the asymmetric labor supply plan of the optimal assignment implementable.
This compulsory pension insurance system shares a similarity with the pension 
insurance systems in developed countries. In Japan, for example, workers must join a 
public earnings-related pension systems (Kousei Nenkin) in addition to the basic public 
pension (Kokumin Nenkin). Older workers (over 65 years) are able to receive pension 
benefits provided their total income (from earnings and pension benefits) does not exceed 
a certain amount (470,000 yen a month in 2020).11 Above this limit, half of the excess is 
reduced from the full pension payment but the basic pension is still paid in full. By 
contrast, not-working youngs cannot join the employee pension scheme and only benefit 
from the basic pension in which the pension premium and benefits are fixed.12 This 
earnings-related property of pension insurance has been adopted in many countries.
5.2. Limited times age-dependent benefit to low-income households
Another policy provides asymmetric protection against preference/productivity shocks in 
old age. Suppose the government provides benefits to not-working households. The 
benefit is age-dependent and “one time” in the sense that a household cannot receive the 
benefit more than once in its lifetime. Let bt denote the benefit to not-working 


































Setting X by (8) for some e not larger than e , we can solve the combination of history 
independent labor income tax and the benefit system that implements an optimal 
assignment by
11 For workers 60 to 64 years old, the amount is 280,000 yen a month in 2020. The 
amount will be raised to 470,000 yen a month in 2022.
12 It is possible to make optional contributions in order to receive a higher pension after 
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where e is an arbitrary number smaller than the upper bound e . Solving the last column 





























Thus, setting e to the upper bound yields the optimal policy combination with minimum 
subsidy system. The last part of table 3 shows the results. The net incomes of young 
households are 0.894 (10.106) for workers and 0.445 (0.2590.186) for non-
workers. Older groups are protected against preference/productivity shocks only if they 
were productive when young.
This benefit system shares a similarity with the U.S. TANF (Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families) program, a block grant that supports low-income families with 
children. The U.S. federal government imposes time limits on TANF recipients.13 In 
general, families cannot receive assistance for more than five years (note that states have 
the flexibility to extend assistance beyond this five-year limit for up to 20% of their 
monthly cases). The federal government also requires welfare recipients to work after 
receiving at most 24 months of TANF benefits, although, again, states can choose shorter 
deadlines.
13 For detailed information on TANF, see U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means (2018, chap. 7).
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6. Conclusions
In the present paper, we investigated optimal labor income tax policies in a two-period 
open economy with a consumption good and indivisible labor in each period. 
Households are identical except for stochastic and discrete preference/productivity types, 
namely productive and unproductive, which affect the disutility of effective labor supply. 
We assumed that individual types and savings (and consumptions) are private 
information. These assumptions imply that the government cannot impose capital 
taxation and that the realized consumption plan must satisfy the Euler condition. We 
define the optimal allocation under the direct mechanism, where the government assigns 
the disposable income-labor supply combination conditional on the history of types 
reported by households.
Because of the difficulty of characterizing the optimal allocation, most of our 
investigation is based on numerical simulation of an example economy. We calculated the 
optimal allocations under various parameter specifications and found they share a 
common property, namely labor supply is sensitive to the preference/productivity shock 
for the old who worked in young while the old who did not work in young must work 
regardless of the shock, for a wide range of parameter specifications.
We also showed that the optimal allocation is implementable under the market 
economy by using appropriate labor income taxation if the tax rate for old groups 
depends not only on their current labor income but also on their history of labor income. 
The optimal allocation is unimplementable, however, under commonly observed tax 
systems that are solely based on current labor income, because the optimal allocation 
requires the difference in the disposable incomes of the working and not-working old 
populations to be history-dependent.
In the next step, we calculated the second-best optimal taxation under the restriction 
that the tax rate depends solely on current labor income. In this respect, the welfare loss 
due to the restriction is likely between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.
Given these findings, we proposed two social security policies to supplement the 
typical tax systems based on current labor income. One was a compulsory pension 
insurance system for young workers that benefits participants if they do not work in old 
age. This system is a standard instrument all around the world. The other was a limited 
times age-dependent benefit provided to low-income households. This program is less 
conventional, but has been established in some countries. We could therefore provide a 
rationale for these social security programs. These policies could be designed to provide 
asymmetric protection against preference/productivity shocks to older groups who 
21
worked when young and did not, and therefore encourage households to work at least 
once. Most of our arguments are based on a numerical example. Many of the claims, 
however, are robust to parameter changes.
References
Albanesi, Stefania and Christopher Sleet. 2006. Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private 
Information. Review of Economic Studies, 73: 1-30.
Diamond, Peter A. 1980. Income Taxation with Fixed Hours of Work. Journal of Public 
Economics, 13: 101-110.
Diamond, Peter A. and James A. Mirrlees. 1978. A Model of Social Insurance with 
Variable Retirement. Journal of Public Economics, 10: 295-336.
Golosov, Mikhail, Narayana Kocherlakota and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2003. Optimal Indirect 
and Capital Taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 70: 569-587.
Golosov, Mikhail and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2006. Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A 
Case for Asset Testing. Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2): 257-279.
Golosov, Mikhail and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2007. Optimal Taxation with Endogenous 
Insurance Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2): 487-534.
Golosov, Mikhail, Aleh Tsyvinski and Ivan Werning. 2007. New Dynamic Public 
Finance: A User’s Guide. NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 21: 317-363.
Grochulski, Borys and Narayana Kocherlakota. 2010. Nonseparable Preferences and 
Optimal Social Security Systems. Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 2055-2077.
Kocherlakota, Narayana. 2005. Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to 
Dynamic Optimal Taxation. Econometrica, 73: 1587-1621.
Kocherlakota, Narayana. 2010. The New Dynamic Public Finance, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Mirrlees, James A. 1971. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. 
Review of Economic Studies, 38: 175-208.
OECD. 2015. Pensions at a Glance 2015: OECD and G20 Indicators, Paris: OECD 
Publishing.
Weinzierl, Matthew. 2011. The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes. Review of 
Economic Studies, 78: 1490-1518.
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means. 2018. 2018 Green Book, 
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2018-green-book.
